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Abstract 
 
This paper documents a research initiative performed on Disruptive Space Technologies (DST) in the European 
space sector and elaborates on a method of forecasting them. The research was performed at the DLR in Bremen in 
co-operation with the University of Groningen as part of the Master thesis of the researcher. This research initiative 
is currently in its infancy and will be extended in the future. The theory of Disruptive Technologies (DTs), first 
introduced by Bower & Christensen (1995), explains the evolution of technologies which disrupt the status quo of 
both dominant technology platforms and competitive market layouts. It does this by having an alternate perceived 
performance mix, which is valued higher by the customer then the dominant technology. This research states that 
there is a difference between DTs as described in business literature and DTs for the space sector. This difference is 
caused by a fundamental difference in market dynamics. The paper explains the difference between the different 
innovation types and DTs. Based on these differences and the characteristics of the space sector, a new theory of 
disruptive space technologies will be developed. Based on this theory a tool will be constructed, which can be used 
as a forecasting method for these disruptive space technologies. It does this by researching indicators which indicate 
a potential for disruptiveness of technologies in the space sector. The indicators resulting from these categories will 
serve as criteria for a concept scoring matrix. This matrix will evaluate and compare several potentially disruptive 
space technology concepts with a dominant space technology. The result of this evaluation will be a forecast of the 
market layout of a specific space technology domain. Nevertheless, the purpose of this paper is not to deliver ready 
to use method, but rather to indicate the general direction in which further research could lead to a complete theory 
of disruptive space technologies and an accurate forecasting method.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Development of space technologies in the Euro-
pean space sector have resulted in many advan-
tages for its citizens in the form of science, tech-
nology, navigation, health and many other areas. 
The European space sector is working continu-
ously to improve these space technologies for its 
citizens in the future. Because of budget con-
straints, only a small portion of the technology 
concepts can be invested in. These technology 
concepts are mostly incremental innovations on 
the current dominant technology, which provide 
small improvements in the performance of a 
technology. According to Summerer (2009) this 
is partly caused because of a risk-adverse culture 
in the space sector, which leaves only a small 
margin of freedom for testing innovations in sub-
systems not strictly needed for achieving mission 
success. An opposite of incremental innovations 
are radical innovations. Radical innovations are 
innovations which cause a technology domain to 
make a leap in its performance evolution. These 
innovations have the potential to be more benefi-
cial to the space sector in general then incre-
mental innovations. Radical innovations are usu-
ally considered as totally new technologies 
within a technology domain, because of their 
fundamental differences towards the previous 
dominant technology. To clarify this, Leifer et al. 
(2000) describes an incremental innovation as the 
exploitation of a technology, while radical inno-
vation is the exploration of a new technology. 
Radical innovations and DTs are also called 
breakthrough technologies and examples of these 
for the space sector include:  
Wireless satellites utilize wireless communica-
tion for data transfer of sensors. This form of data 
transfer, although it does not have the same trans-
fer capacity, it does decrease weight through the 
elimination of wires.  
Nanosats, Microsats and Cubesats are techno-
logically less advanced then conventional satel-
lites but provide a practical test bed for universi-
ties because of the use of commercial of the shelf 
electronics, and their absolute low cost compared 
to normal satellites.  
Spaceship two by Virgin Galactic is technologi-
cal inferior to any rocket, because it reaches only 
space and not an actual orbit. It does however 
fulfill another perceived performance, which is 
the function of space tourism and a method of 
relative cheap long zero gravity testing.  
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Laser communications which have lower power, 
tighter focus/footprint, dramatically increased 
bandwidth, lighter weigh (Lambert, 1995).  
Nanotubes, have the possibility to form high 
strength, lightweight tethers or other materials. 
(Heide et al., 2009) 
 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
A DT is an exception to the radical / incremental 
innovations theory, which Christensen (2002) 
calls; sustaining innovations because they con-
tinue serving the same customers with the inten-
tion to sustain their position in the market. Like a 
radical innovation, a DT is a new technology 
which replaces an old dominant technology. A 
DT however does this in an unusual manner, 
because in the beginning it actually ‘under per-
forms’ compared to the dominant technology. 
This under performance is viewed from the cur-
rent customer-perceived value and does not re-
flect the latent and future needs. The customer-
perceived value is the total value customers per-
ceive of all the functional attributes of a technol-
ogy. Functional attributes are performance indi-
cators which a technology can be measured on, 
like speed, maneuverability, reliability, costs, 
quality. This is different for every customer and it 
is what divides the main market into market 
niches. DTs are usually first successful in a mar-
ket niche and then through a process, which 
Christensen (1997) calls low-end encroachment, 
take over the main market. Low-end encroach-
ment is caused by a change in perceived per-
formance of customers over time. Perceived per-
formance is the customer perceived value of the 
performance of a technology. In other words; it is 
a mix of performance attributes which a customer 
perceives as important for its needs. Figure 1 
illustrates what this entails with an example of 
the rigid disk drive industry from Christensen 
(1997). This industry had several DTs in the form 
of different disk drives sizes. Even though bigger 
drives had relative a larger hard disk capacity, 
people still wanted smaller disk drives because 
they were more portable. This process coincided 
with the emergence of smaller computers and 
caused companies manufacturing the larger 
drives to be pushed out of the main market into 
the market niche of a higher market segment. The 
company, controlling the market with a dominant 
technology, is called an incumbent. The focus of 
the customer shifting from the capacity to the 
portability functional attribute is called a change 
in perceived performance.  
As can be seen in Figure 1, Christensen (1997) 
persist on measuring performance on one per-
formance attribute; hard disk capacity, while 
actually the smaller disk drives are over perform-
ing on the basis of portability. This extra dimen-
sion in functional attributes in measuring per-
formance for technologies was researched by 
Adner (2002).  
 
 
Figure 1: Intersecting trajectories of capacity de-
manded versus capacity supplied in the rigid disk 
drives (Christensen, 1997) 
 
Adner (2002) constructed a method to illustrate 
differences in perceived performance of different 
technologies and called them value trajectories 
which are composed in Figure 2. Value trajecto-
ries are technology domains which fulfill a cer-
tain type of perceived performance. The value 
trajectory passes through several indifference 
curves and shows the levels of performance re-
quirements from different market segments on 
two different functional attributes. Indifference 
curves are the levels of minimal required per-
formance of functional attributes. After a tech-
nology has fulfilled the performance required by 
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this indifference curve, additional performance 
will be appreciated by the customer as long as he 
does not have to sacrifice on the performance of 
other functional attributes. So the customer is 
indifferent for further performance increase. For 
example; a customer of the Ikea will value a bet-
ter quality of products as long as it means that it 
does not have to make any concessions on costs. 
  
 
Figure 2: Value trajectory by Adner (2002) 
 
To clarify this matter, Figure 3 shows the differ-
ent value trajectories and their indifference 
curves of the technology of stationary PCs and 
handheld PDAs with respect to the functional 
attributes storage capacity and portability. Prod-
uct A is a PC which fulfills the high-end market 
segment while product B does the same thing for 
the PDA high-end market segment. 
 
 
Figure 3: Value trajectory example by Adner (2002) 
 
As can be seen, customers of a PDA technology 
are quickly satisfied with a low storage capacity 
while the portability attribute is valued much 
higher. The customers of the PC technology have 
an alternate perceived performance and value 
storage capacity higher then portability. Other 
examples of that have a value trajectory and in-
difference curves in this graph are netbooks, lap-
tops and tablet pcs. The phenomenon of changing 
value trajectories or changing perceived perform-
ance can also occur within one technology do-
main. For example automobiles were first primar-
ily valued on speed, after which esthetics, func-
tionality and safety became more important at-
tributes, creating an indifference of most custom-
ers to speed. With respect to space, the first rock-
ets were measured on capabilities while later 
reliability, safety and especially costs became 
more important. 
 
TECHNOLOGY EVOLUTION 
An S-Curve is the most common way to illustrate 
the evolution of a technology over time. Because 
of this, the S-Curve is often also referred to as a 
life cycle analogy tool. The S-Curve has three 
distinctive parts (Abernathy & Utterback 1978): 
o The fluid phase 
o The transitional phase  
o The specific phase  
These different phases are illustrated in Figure 6. 
The fluid phase depicts the slow progress in per-
formance gain in the beginning because of little 
attention from researchers in the market. Tech-
nologies in this part are the radical or DTs, as 
they are a new technology which replaces an old 
technology or opens up a new market. The transi-
tional phase is the phase where the new technol-
ogy takes off. Argawal (2002) claims that there is 
an average of 42.3 years between the invention of 
a technology and its sales take-off.  The specific 
phase is the phase in which the technology ma-
tures and reaches the end of its potential per-
formance. Sahal et al. (1982) proposes that the 
rate of improvement in performance of a given 
technology declines because of limits of scale 
(e.g. things become either impossibly large or 
small) or system complexity (e.g. things become 
too complex to work perfectly). When these lim-
its are reached, the only possible way to maintain 
the pace of progress is through radical/disruptive 
system redefinition.  
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Figure 4: S-Curve with its different phases from Aber-
nathy & Utterback (1978) 
 
When the perceived performance changes in 
favor of the DT, it actually starts to over perform 
the dominant technology and eventually pushes it 
out of the market. This process is especially 
harmful for the incumbent. In the past there have 
been many examples of this, but arguably the 
most visible was the disruption in the portable 
music player’s technology domain.  
Sony Corporation dominated the market of port-
able music players with their CD-players or Disc-
mans when Apple introduced their first MP3 
player, the iPod. Although the iPod was not the 
first MP3 player, it was the first one to combine 
high capacity with an innovative user interface. 
Apple with their iPod eventually disrupted the 
Discmans from Sony, which entails that Apple 
became the biggest player in the market of port-
able music players, replacing Sony. So how did 
this happen? Why did Sony not come with its 
own version of an MP3 player? The problem 
originates in determining the perceived perform-
ance. Sony never thought MP3 players had a 
future, because in their infancy, MP3 players had 
major drawbacks of low capacity, low sound 
quality, the extra step of converting your CD into 
MP3 and no exchangeable data carrier. More 
than that, when they asked their current custom-
ers if they perceived the new technology as valu-
able, which they did not. So Sony perceived it as 
sensible not to invest in this new technology and 
invest in their Minidiscs instead. However, Sony 
did not reckon with a change in perceived per-
formance. This particular change was caused by 
external factors; the internet and flash technol-
ogy. The combination of downloading songs 
from the internet and higher capacity, which was 
caused by incremental innovation in the technol-
ogy of flash storage, proved to be a disruptive 
force in the market of portable music players. 
This market with the different types (Radical and 
Disruptive innovation) of innovations is illus-
trated in Figure 5. As can be seen in this figure, 
the technology development in a domain can be 
seen as a series of overlapping S-Curves or an 
envelope curve (Beer 1981). 
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Figure 5: Envelope curve of portable music players 
 
DISRUPTIVE SPACE TECHNOLOGIES 
Even though there are many examples of DTs 
documented in business literature, none of these 
concern space technologies. After several inter-
views with experts of the space sector, the con-
clusion was made that the conventional theory of 
DTs is not entirely applicable to the market dy-
namics of the space sector. This is caused by the 
following reasons: 
o Time: The development of a space technol-
ogy takes a long time; therefore the reponce 
time of incumbent to DTs is very high. They 
do this by either starting a development proc-
ess of their own (if the development time 
permits it), or take over the company market-
ing the new technology.  
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o Risk/Return on investment: The long de-
velopment time of a space technology means 
that the return and risk on investment is 
equally high, this is a barrier for new start up 
companies. And prevents a start-up of be-
coming disruptive with an innovative idea. 
o Investments: Space technologies often have 
a significant amount of money invested into 
them in the form of equipment purchases, 
development costs, proprietary knowledge, 
human capital etc. These non-recurring costs 
lead to a reluctance of incumbents to canni-
balize existing technology developments for 
new technology developments (Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1982). 
o Flight heritage: A dominant space technol-
ogy already has a long flight heritage. Flight 
heritage means that the technology has al-
ready been extensively tested in space, which 
benefits reliability and decreases risk. A new 
space technology candidate has to be a sig-
nificantly improvement to the dominant 
technology to justify the change of increases 
in risk and decreases in reliability. 
o Complexity: The complexity of space tech-
nologies rarely allows them to be measured 
on only one or two performance criteria. This 
entails that evaluating them is equally com-
plex. 
o Testing: The testing of space technologies is 
very expensive, and therefore only occurs if 
there is sufficient faith in the technology and 
if a technology is mature enough. This is an 
obstacle in the development of space tech-
nologies, as test results only come in a late 
phase of the development. 
 
Because of these reasons, a new theory has been 
developed for breakthrough technologies in the 
space sector, or disruptive space technologies 
(DSTs).  When analyzing the innovation litera-
ture and the theory of DTs, a resemblance can be 
found between radical innovations and DTs. Both 
are explorations of new technologies and replace, 
dominant technology and offer a higher per-
ceived performance. Because of this high degree 
of similarity, the choice has been made to com-
bine both theories in a new DST theory, which 
will have the following characteristics: 
1 DSTs are product innovations according to 
the 4P paradigm (Product, Process, Para-
digm and Position innovation) of Francis 
(2005), because a technology is always a 
product innovation. This research will there-
fore only be applicable to forecast space 
technologies. (As an example: Commercial 
space is a paradigm innovation, a while 
commercial spacecraft is a product innova-
tion.) 
2 DSTs are explorations of new technologies. 
This means that they represent a significant 
improvement in technology along a contin-
ued perceived performance (radical) or dis-
continued perceived performance (disrup-
tive).  
3  A concept with a DST potential is always in 
the fluid phase or concept phase of a tech-
nology as depicted in the Abernathy & Ut-
terback (1978) model in Figure 4. This 
means that their greatest competitor is the 
dominant space technology. Usually the 
technology has not been tested yet in the op-
erating environment. The disruption of the 
dominant technology occurs in the transi-
tional phase. In the specific phase the tech-
nology gains extensive flight heritage and 
reaches the end of it potential gain in per-
formance.  
4  The customers in the case of DSTs are not 
consumers or companies, but rather mis-
sions, as these determine the requirements of 
a technology. The mission in term is deter-
mined by national and international space 
agencies. The actual delivery of the technol-
ogy is often (but not always) done by the 
space industry through different programs 
and policies.   
 
Figure 6: Customer-supplier chain of the space sector 
 
Ultimately the space program determined by 
a national government should serve the 
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needs and desires of citizens of a nation. 
This customer-supplier chain is also illus-
trated in Figure 6. 
5 A technology can be disruptive by changing 
the requirements and/or capabilities of other 
subsystems in a spacecraft in which those 
technologies become breakthrough tech-
nologies. 
 
The points above lead to the following defini-
tions of a DST:  
 
A DST is an emerging technology, which disrupts 
the status quo of the space sector by radically 
improving on the perceived performance re-
quired by a certain (set of) mission(s), creates 
possibilities of improvement of other technolo-
gies or opens up new opportunities.  
 
 
FORECASTING METHOD 
The method will contain criteria which are based 
on indicators for DSTs. The criteria are divided 
into three categories according to the three long 
term forecasting signals of Strong et al (2009):  
o Signpost  
o Measurement of interest 
o Vision 
 
When looking at the three signals, the signpost 
signal explains the dynamics of DST evolution in 
relation to the dominant technology and the per-
ceived performance, the measurement of interest 
signals elaborated on a method to determine the 
perceived performance and the vision signal 
identifies the indicators that externally influence 
the perceived performance. The generated criteria 
for these categories will be put in a matrix and 
measured by experts. The different signals for 
DSTs will be elaborated next. The matrix itself 
with its criteria is illustrated in annex 1.  
 
SIGNPOST SIGNAL 
The signpost signals are clearly recognizable 
future events on the market. For example: The 
point where one space technology pushes another 
technology out of the market. This set of criteria 
focuses on the characteristics of DSTs evolution. 
A popular way to illustrate this is the S-Curve 
life cycle analogy tool illustrated in Figure 4. 
Using these S-Curves, the two main categories of 
DSTs can be illustrated: 
o The continued perceived performance 
o The discontinues perceived performance 
The first category, the continued perceived per-
formance trajectory and is illustrated in Figure 7. 
In this figure, a DST is replacing a dominant 
technology with the performance requirements 
increasing (ΔP) along the same perceived per-
formance trajectory at a certain time (X1).  
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The second category is the discontinued per-
ceived performance trajectory. There can be mul-
tiple reasons why a perceived performance 
changes over time; the functional requirements of 
one performance value are met and further per-
formance gain creates indifference according to 
the theory of Adner (2002). Perhaps the mission 
purpose changes which results in a change of 
requirements of performance values. Also politi-
cal decisions can influence the requirement of a 
technology; this will be discussed in the Vision 
signal. Whatever the reason is, if the perceived 
performance demand changes and the new tech-
nology fills this need better then the dominant 
one, it will disrupt the latter. This type of DST is 
also illustrated in Figure 8. In this the situation is 
viewed from the old perceived performance tra-
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jectory and the new. For example in at X1, when 
viewed from the old perceived performance (A), 
the dominant technology is better then the DST. 
However when view from the new perceived 
performance (B) the DST over performs the 
dominant technology.  
 
Figure 8: Discontinued perceived performance  
DST 
 
It is important for both categories to determine 
how and in what way perceived performance has 
changed over time. An example of how this could 
be done has been given in Stellmann (2009). She 
constructed several graphs in which the evolu-
tions of performance attributes of technologies 
are illustrated. A trend in the increase or even 
decrease of performance could indicate a shift in 
importance of this functional attribute. An exam-
ple of one of these graphs has been given in 
Figure 9. In this figure the evolution of the per-
formance of a power subsystem as a function of 
the power output and the mass is given. As can 
be seen, the performance has over time and is 
thus an important attribute.  
 
 
Figure 9: Evolution example (Stellmann, 2009) 
 
This research on performance evolution is a key 
part of the method which will help determine a 
trend towards the future. This trend or expected 
trajectory was also noted by Christensen (1995) 
as a method to assess DTs. As can be seen in 
Figure 10, the current performance combined 
with the expected trajectory of performance im-
provement can lead to a forecast of when one 
technology will disrupt another. 
 
 
Figure 10: How to assess DTs  
(Bower & Christensen, 1995) 
 
It has to be noted however that historical data 
alone is not a good indicator for the change in 
perceived performance. Looking back at Adner’s 
(2002) indifference curves, a domain might have 
already fulfilled the customer’s minimal require-
ments and shifted its focus on another perform-
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ance attribute. Therefore this method of deter-
mining the perceived performance has to be han-
dled with great care and a continuous lookout has 
to be for indifference curves. An example of this 
could be a propulsion technology for human 
spaceflight exceeding the acceleration of normal 
human gravity of 1G. 
 
Additionally DSTs can also be disruptive because 
they have an impact or they affect technologies in 
other domains. In some cases the way in which 
DSTs are combined with other technologies de-
termines the disruptiveness of a technology. The 
committee on forecasting future DTs of the 
America National Research Council (2009) made 
categories to determine different kinds of DTs. If 
a technology has one or multiple aspects of these 
categories then its potential for disruptiveness 
will increase. These categories, adapted to the 
space sector, are:  
Enablers: A technology that makes one or more 
new technologies, processes or applications pos-
sible (e.g. integrated circuit => smaller Data 
Mgmt S/S; Solar cell => rechargeable S/C).  
Catalysts: A technology that alters the rate of 
change of a technical development or alters the 
rate of improvement of one or more technologies 
(e.g. cubesats/ swarm technologies; distributed 
systems, flash memory drive).  
Morphers: A technology that when combined 
with another technology creates one or more new 
technologies (e.g. wireless technologies and mi-
croprocessors).  
Spin-ins/spin outs: A technology that crosses 
over from one market to another and disrupts the 
status quo in the new market (e.g. Nano tubes and 
medical scanners (Heide et al., 2009)).  
Multiple technology disruption: A technology 
that replaces not only one, but multiple technolo-
gies. On its own the technology is not better then 
a single technology, but because of its combined 
function, the technology is better then the whole 
of the single technologies. (e.g. Solar sail replac-
ing the propulsion system, the propellant con-
tainment, decreasing power requirements etc.) 
The following main criteria are derived from the 
signpost signal: 
o How does the technology perform on the 
future performance mix determined by 
the historical performance evolution? 
o Does the technology have one or more 
additional aspects of a disruptive space 
technology? 
o What is the technology attractiveness? 
 
MEASUREMENT OF INTEREST SIGNAL 
A measurement of interest is a technical perform-
ance value. Weight, dimension and efficiency are 
examples of performance attributes for solar pan-
els. These performance attributes have to be 
measured according to a certain technology do-
main and the purpose of a technology. This will 
result in different weights of importance for the 
performance criteria which will be the current 
perceived performance. As an example the ad-
vance propulsion domain of the ESA technology 
tree (ESA, 2008) has been taken. This technology 
domain contains several technology concepts 
with a potential for disruptiveness. These tech-
nologies were analyzed in light of a proposed 
mission of a rendezvous with a comet of a space 
probe. This mission was proposed to a group of 
engineers of the department of space analysis 
transportation (SART) at the DLR in Bremen. 
The purpose of this workshop was to identify the 
performance attributes relevant in evaluating a 
technology and determining the importance of 
them. At this workshop a total of 27 criteria were 
deemed as important and 7 of these were identi-
fied as the most important ones. These were then 
ranked in order of importance and weightings 
were allocated to them. The results of this work-
shop are illustrated in Figure 11. 
In general space technologies can be categorized 
in three main value types;  
o Technology specific attributes 
o Cost value  
o Quality value.  
 
The technology specific attributes contain per-
formance values which are specific to the tech-
nology and the type of mission. These include; 
specific impulse, thrust, throttle ability, radiation 
resistance, power consumption etc. The cost 
value contains all the costs related to the technol-
ogy, for example; the recurring costs, the non-
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recurring costs, operating costs, launch costs 
(which is determined by the mass and dimension) 
etc. The quality value contains all the quality 
performance measurements like; lifetime, flexi-
bility, reliability, risk etc.  
 
 
Figure 11: The required perceived performance for 
advanced space propulsion in a radar chart 
 
VISION SIGNAL 
The vision signal is a long term vague description 
of a possible future on the market. These are the 
factors that will influence the perceived perform-
ance in the future. The future of space develop-
ment is generally determined by three things: 
o The space policies 
o The political forces that changes space 
policies 
o The long term state of the market 
These will be elaborated next. The long term plan 
and strategy of the European space sector is de-
termined by ESA in the European space policy. 
This space policy provides a long-term future 
guideline along which technologies have to be 
developed. This policy however also changes 
over time according to Suzuki (2003). These 
changes have to be analyzed over time in order to 
make sure a DST is still disruptive in a policy 
changing market. An example of this is the 
American president Obama cancelling the Con-
stellation program in 2010. Additionally a long-
term vision signal has been set up based on the 
Space 2030 report from the OECD. This reports 
states three possible futures in which different 
states of the world are analyzed, the smooth sail-
ing, back to the future and stormy weather sce-
nario. If a technology has a chance to succeed in 
all of these scenarios then its potential for disrup-
tiveness will rise. The following main criteria are 
derived from the vision signal: 
o How well does the technology concept 
reinforce the technology objectives of the 
space policy?  
o What is the technology concept's robust-
ness against policy changes?  
o Does the technology concept contribute 
to the forecasted future of the space mar-
ket? 
 
METHOD EXPLANATION 
As stated before the criteria which resulted in 
these categories are measured according to a 
concept scoring matrix from Ulrich & Eppinger 
(2003). The scoring matrix itself is illustrated in 
annex 1. The method will use a weighted factor 
to adjust the level importance of the criteria 
elaborated before. The allocation of the weighted 
factor per criteria will differ with every evaluated 
concept and will have to be determined by the 
evaluator based on evaluation concept character-
istics. For testing purposes we have already set 
the weight of the criteria, based on expert’s opin-
ion or according to the researcher’s discretion.  
Most criteria will result in numbers which can be 
compared with each other. This result will then 
have to be compared to the dominant technology 
in space. This technology will be the reference 
for the new technology concepts considered in 
this method. Scoring higher then the reference 
technology will result in a score of 50 or more 
(compare Table 1). A score of above 50 will in-
dicate a potential for disruptiveness of a technol-
ogy concept, the higher the score, the higher the 
potential.  
 
Table 1: Scoring matrix from 
Ulrich & Eppinger (2003)  
Rating Relative performance 
0 Much worse then reference technology 
25 Worse then reference technology 
50 Same as reference technology 
75 Better than reference technology 
100 Much better than reference technology 
 
The matrix has 4 levels of aggregation; the ma-
trix, the category, the criteria and the sub-criteria 
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level. The different levels and their method of 
calculation will be elaborated below and is visu-
alized in  
Table 2. As stated before, the weighted score 
(WS) has to be calculated by multiplying the 
rating (R) with the weight (W). 
 
WS = R .W   
 
The score of the category level is the sum of the 
weighted scores of the sub levels multiplied by 
its weight. So for example the total weighted 
score (TW) of category 1 is calculated by the sum 
of all its criteria multiplied by it weight.  
 
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1TW = (Ws +Ws +Ws ).W   
 
While criteria with sub-criteria will be calculated 
in the same way as categories: 
 
 1.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.3Ws = (Ws +Ws +Ws ).W   
 
In turn the overall total (OT) is the sum of the 
total weighted scores is calculated as follows: 
   
 1 2 3OT = TW TW TW    
 
Table 2: Example of scoring matrix 
# W R WS
1 33%
1.1 33% 60 20.00
1.1 33% 70 23.33
1.3 33% 50 17.78
1.3.1 33% 30 10.00
1.3.2 33% 90 30.00
1.3.3 33% 40 13.33
TW 61.11
2 33%
TW 44.00
3 33%
TW 66.00
57.04Overall total (OT)  
W= Weight, R= Rating, WS= Weighted score, TW= 
Total weight OT= Overall total 
 
This overall total is the end result for a technol-
ogy. Any score over 50 will mean that it has a 
disruptive potential. However because multiple 
technologies concepts out of field are analyzed, 
the highest score has the highest chance to actu-
ally become disruptive (as usually only one tech-
nology per domain becomes disruptive). There-
fore the forecast of, after testing all technology 
concepts in a technology domain with a set pur-
pose, is the technology with the highest disrup-
tive potential.  
 
BIAS MITIGATION 
The method is a qualitative method, because it is 
weighted and filled in by experts. A major down-
side of this is that bias can influence the outcome 
of the forecast and decrease its accuracy. There-
fore the research has identified three forms of 
bias and methods of mitigating them: 
Personal bias - It could be that they have a per-
sonal interest in the outcome of the forecast and 
are therefore tended to answer in favor of this 
personal interest. Therefore mitigating this bias 
will involve the selection of expert without any 
personal gain the selection of any of the technol-
ogy concepts. 
Age bias - According to Carstensen (1999) and 
Fingerman & Perlmutter (1995) young people are 
more future orientated then people from an older 
generation. This age bias could lead to a forecast-
ing error as the older generation has a more con-
servative view then the youth on the possible 
future. Fingerman & Perlmutter (1995) state that 
younger people are more accurate in predicting 
the long-term future, while older people with 
more experience see patterns more easily and are 
better to predict the near-future. Supporting this 
is the first-law of Clarke (1962): “When a distin-
guished but elderly scientist states that something 
is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he 
states that something is impossible, he is very 
probably wrong.” This research adopts the view 
that just because the forecast is biased, it does not 
mean that it is incorrect. Therefore one of the 
approaches to mitigate the age bias in forecasting 
is to consider the time horizon of the forecast and 
assign the appropriate generation to forecast 
them. For example long term forecast should be 
done by a younger generation while short term 
forecasts should be done by the more experienced 
older generation. In light of the long term fore-
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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cast in this research, preference has to be given to 
a younger generation in selection of experts.  
Cultural Bias - Another form of bias in forecast-
ing is cultural bias. Lam et. al, (2005) has advo-
cated that culture has an influence on forecasting. 
This deals with considerable differences in val-
ues, beliefs, norms and worldviews in societies 
around the world. These differences could lead 
too different views on what the future for a cul-
ture has to bring. When selecting the forecasting 
participants, special attention has to be paid to 
their culture. It would be wise to use as interna-
tionally orientated participants as possible as to 
reduce the cultural bias. Because of the context of 
this research, all technologies will be on a global 
and thus international scale. This means the par-
ticipants should be as culturally diverse as possi-
ble. 
Linguistic bias - Bond & Chung (1984) found out 
that people have a bias resulting from the lan-
guage used in the survey. Because this method 
and the resulting matrix are in English, bilinguals 
might answer differently then they might do in 
their native language. According to the studies of 
Bennett (1977) and Marin et al. (1983) bilinguals 
give more extreme and social desirable answers. 
Mitigating this bias would require to translate the 
method to the native language of the participant. 
This translation does however have the problem 
of losing quality or meaning to the original ver-
sion, this because sometimes important aspects 
get lost in translation. It is therefore recom-
mended to stay with the original version as miti-
gating the bias would lead to more problems. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The paper started by elaborating what DT in the 
area of innovation is and what DSTs are. DSTs 
differ from the DT theory of Christensen (1997) 
because the space sector works differently. A 
new theory for DSTs was constructed and a 
method for forecasting them was made. This 
method uses a matrix based on the concept scor-
ing matrix from Ulrich & Eppinger (2003) to 
measure the potential disruptiveness for space of 
technology concepts. This method relies on the 
evaluation of criteria which indicate the disrup-
tiveness of a technology concept. The criteria are 
ordered according to three long term forecasting 
signals as described by Strong et al (2009); Sign-
post, Measurement of interest and Vision. The 
Signpost signal contains the criteria that indicate 
the disruptiveness of a space technology through 
the technology evolution theory. The Measure-
ment of interest signal describes a method of 
determining the perceived performance of a tech-
nology, while the Vision signal provides indica-
tors what influences this perceived performance 
over time. The resulting method listed in annex 1, 
will determine a technology’s potential for dis-
ruptiveness and the technology with the highest 
potential in a certain domain will be most likely 
disruptive. This is the forecast which is given at 
the end of the method. 
 
OUTLOOK 
The accuracy of the forecasting method elabo-
rated in this paper is restricted by a number of 
limitations of the research.  
Firstly, the indicators or criteria for disruptive-
ness found in this research might not have been 
exhausting, perhaps additional criteria will also 
prove to be relevant in assessing the disruptive 
potential. This was however hard to asses in the 
time frame of this research. For this purpose, 
further empirical research in space technology 
evolution over time is needed.  
Secondly the weight of the different criteria in 
the context of determining the potential for dis-
ruptiveness still requires more research. Since no 
literature has to date been made on this subject, 
the current weight is just a view of the researcher 
and might lead to an inaccurate forecast.  
Thirdly the method is designed for the European 
space sector. This focus limits the applicability of 
the method. Therefore the recommendation is 
that further research should focus on the global 
space market.  
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Annex 1: Scoring matrix of the forecasting method 
 
 
